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The Institutionalization of Party Systems – Bulgaria, Romania, 
Croatia and Slovenia in a Comparative Perspective1
Petr Jurek
Abstract: This article focuses on the analysis of the institutionalization of party 
systems. The objects of the analysis are four party systems of post-communist coun-
tries – Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia. To assess the degree of institu-
tionalization, three quantitative criteria are used: electoral volatility, the effective 
number of parties and the parliamentary age of parties. The main aims of the anal-
ysis are to compare aforementioned party systems’ degree of institutionalization 
and simultaneously confi rm the assumption that post-communist party systems are 
in a far more heterogeneous category than is often suggested. At fi rst, the article 
defi nes and explains the institutionalization of party systems and uncovers the pos-
sibilities of its quantitative assessment. Then, the level of institutionalization of Bul-
garian, Croatian, Romanian and Slovenian party systems is evaluated. There are 
two main conclusions. First, the institutionalization of a party system in the case of 
Slovenia and Croatia is on a considerably higher level than in the cases of Bulgaria 
and Romania, although there is some positive progress in the case of Romania in 
the last fi ve years. Second, common trends, connected with institutionalization and 
often mentioned as overall, don’t have a strong reliance on empirical measures.
Keywords: institutionalization, party system, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, 
Slovenia, electoral volatility, effective number of parties, age of parliamentary parties
Introduction
The party systems of post-communist countries are a common subject of political 
analysis. The formation of these party systems has brought about an occasion for 
revisiting theories and concepts developed pursuant to the experiences of Western 
advanced democracies. Such theories and concepts weren’t able to deal with the 
specifi c operation of party systems in Central and Eastern Europe, so it was neces-
sary to adapt them to this new reality.
The specifi cs of post-communist party systems could be largely associated with 
the overall exceptionality of the transition to democracy in the case of Central and 
Eastern Europe, which created a specifi c set of conditions for the development of 
1 This article was prepared as part of the grant project Stranické systémy zemí středovýchodní Ev-
ropy [Party Systems in the Countries of Eastern Central Europe] (P408/10/0295) through the 
Grant Agency Czech Republic. The paper has been presented at the conference Czech Political 
Parties in International Comparison (Plzeň, May 2010).
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party systems. P. Mair (1998:178) points at the absence of civic society (with the 
certain exception of Poland). The communistic power monopoly didn’t allow the 
independent compounding of citizens by virtue of their common interest, which 
could eventually become a base of dissent. After the fall of communistic regimes, 
new polities to deal with two, in some cases actually three, transitions simultane-
ously. The transformation of economical systems proceeded at the same time as 
the transformation of political systems, and, in some cases (e.g. the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia), nation building occurred as well. In advanced 
democracies, such fundamental changes took place in the long term, but post-
communist countries had to carry them out during quite a short period of time. 
Moreover, the party systems of post-communist countries didn’t emerge during 
a long-term process of democratization, instead they begun to develop after the 
democratization of the political system had been achieved.
By aforesaid differences, a number of deviations in the shape and operation of 
party systems in post-communist political systems has emerged. Many attempts at 
describing and explaining these differences have appeared in the past two decades. 
Examining the level of institutionalization of party systems is one the most fre-
quent. Institutionalization has a crucial impact on the operation of party systems, 
since it concerns the stability of the mechanism operating within the system and 
thus infl uences the predictability of the future direction and function of that system.
The main aim of this study is to analyze the level of institutionalization in four 
cases of post-communist party systems. Party systems taken under analysis are 
those of Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Slovenia. All analyzed cases fall into the 
category of post-communist states. Three of them are members of the European 
Union; Croatia is an applicant for full membership. Croatia and Slovenia have 
a common past within Yugoslavia, after its disintegration both polities had to pass 
through the nation-building process. By a mainly quantitative analysis of the insti-
tutionalization of party systems, we can argue that post-communist party systems 
are in a far more heterogeneous category than is often suggested.
The study is subdivided into three sections. First, we analyze the possibilities of 
measuring the level of institutionalization and thus develop an analytical frame-
work. Then, we use three indicators for rendering the analysis of institutionaliza-
tion of party systems in Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. In conclusion, 
we summarize our observations and discuss some contentious issues.
Party system institutionalization
„Institutionalization refers to a process by which a practice or organization be-
comes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted. In politics, 
institutionalization means that political actors have clear and stable expectations 
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about the behaviour of other actors. […] An institutionalized party system, then, is 
one in which actors develop expectations and behaviour based on the premise that 
the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behaviour will prevail 
into the foreseeable future“ (Mainwaring – Torcal 2006: 206). Shortly taken, insti-
tutionalization means stability in the patterns of political parties’ behaviour and in 
the basic framework of party systems.
J. Bielasiak has used two quantitative indicators for the determination of the rate 
of institutionalization – the index of electoral volatility and the index of effec-
tive number of parties. A high range of electoral volatility and fragmentation of 
a party system signify a fl uid political environment and thus signalize a lower rate 
of party system institutionalization (Bielasiak 2002: 198–206). Besides, Bielasiak 
sees the stability of electoral rules as an inseparable part of the problem, because 
the frequent changing of the rules of the game could negatively affect the level of 
institutionalization (Bielasiak 2002: 191).
S. Mainwaring and M. Torcal (2006: 206–207) identify four main dimensions of 
party system institutionalization. The fi rst, institutionalized party systems embody 
stabilized patterns of party competition. This dimension is obviously the most im-
portant of all, because stability is the fundamental aspect of institutionalization. It 
could be measured by an evaluation of electoral volatility.
The second dimension includes the mutual connections of political parties and 
society. In an institutionalized party system, parties are deeply rooted in society 
and vice versa. It means that there exist strong linkages between parties and voters. 
As a result, party competition embodies a high degree of stability and regularity. 
Shifts of electoral support don’t occur as wholesale as in less institutionalized party 
systems. This dimension could also be (at least partly) evaluated by the observa-
tion of electoral volatility. A low level of electoral volatility signifi es tight linkages 
between parties and society.
The perception of political parties by society is the important component of in-
stitutionalization. Political parties should be taken as a fundamental component of 
democracy. Although voters can express negative attitudes towards the individual 
parties, they should respect parties and party systems as political institutions.
The fourth dimension of institutionalization by Mainwaring and Torcal affects link-
ages between parties and their leaders. Parties shouldn’t be existentially dependent 
on one leader; parties shouldn’t be an instrument for promoting the interests of such 
a leader. If it is, it can seriously affect the level of party system institutionalization.
P. Webb and S. White point out that institutionalization is usually related to party 
systems; nevertheless we can’t leave out individual parties. The stability of pat-
terns of party competition is strongly infl uenced by the autonomy of party organiza-
tion, development of their organizational structure, their rooting in society and so 
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on (Webb – White 2007: 4–5). Only party systems insisting on the existence of 
consolidated political parties can be treated as institutionalized. The persistence of 
political parties in a party system could be applied as an indicator of parties’ stabil-
ity. Of course, we can’t deduce causality between the age of a political party and its 
internal institutionalization; nevertheless this indicator could be taken as additional.
The institutionalization shouldn’t be envisaged as a dichotomous category, where 
all systems can be categorized as institutionalized or not institutionalized. The ex-
perience of post-communist party systems has showed that such an approach is 
misleading, since there can’t be found clear division between both categories.2 
A better way is to refl ect on the institutionalization as a continuum and evaluate 
institutionalization in terms of its rate (Mainwaring – Torcal 2006: 205). Thus, the 
level of institutionalization in several cases of party systems can be compared and, 
as a result of the comparison, party systems can be placed on the axis labelled “fully 
institutionalized – not institutionalized”.
If we try to synthesize the aforementioned possibilities of a quantitative evalua-
tion of the level of institutionalization, we come to the three available indicators: 
electoral volatility, the effective number of parties and the average age of parties.
Electoral volatility
Electoral volatility is the indicator of the stability of party system. The classical 
approach to the measurement of electoral volatility was developed by Morgens 
Pedersen (1983). Electoral volatility describes shifts of electoral support within 
the party system between two subsequent elections. In calculating, all percentage 
shifts of electoral support are summarized and then divided by two. In the case of 
the creation, downfall, merger or division of political parties, fi ctitious parties with 
zero electoral gains are added to the calculation.3
Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility has been widely used for analyzing the sta-
bility of party systems since its creation, without being signifi cantly revised. Notwith-
standing, it contains one problem in itself – it measures all kinds of shifts of party 
preferences no matter their nature. So, the main limitation of Pedersen’s classical in-
dex is that it is not able to grasp separately the issues of the creation, downfall, merger 
and division of political parties, which is typical for post-communist politics (Birch 
2001: 1). E. N. Powell and J. A. Tucker came up with a modifi cation of the index of 
volatility, which is able to take into account character of shifts of electoral support. 
They have divided volatility into two types: type A which refl ects the shifts of election 
2 Good example of disputableness of this approach is attempt of G. Sartori to set off certain party 
systems as fl uid systems or non-systems (Sartori 2005/1976: 217–242). According to Mainwaring 
and Torcal (2006: 205–206), he didn’t eschew some excessive simplifi cations and inadequacies.
3 For equation see Pedersen 1983.
Politics in Central Europe.indd   113 8.7.10   11:26
114
The Institutionalization of Party Systems – Bulgaria, Romania, 
Croatia and Slovenia in a Comparative Perspective Petr Jurek
results caused by the emergence or disappearance of political parties, while the vola-
tility of type B is calculated from the shifts in electoral gains among existing parties. 
The calculation procedure is based on Pedersen’s equation, the only difference is that 
type A and type B volatility are counted separately4 (Powell – Tucker 2009b: 5–7).
For evaluating the electoral volatility of concerned countries, we use the index 
of volatility modifi ed by Powell and Tucker, because their approach allows us to 
distinguish the spillover of voters’ support between existing parties, which is to 
a certain extent normal and for the proper alternation of power in democracy also 
useful, from volatility caused by the emergence and disappearance of new political 
parties, which indicates the instability party systems. Using this modifi ed calcula-
tion of volatility thus enables us to capture maybe the most important difference 
of post-communist party systems. Results of such a measurement can also highly 
demonstrate the extent to which parties are rooted in society.
Effective number of parties
When evaluating the number of parties in party systems, we don’t make do with 
merely the sum of relevant parties in the party system. Such an approach does not 
take account of the variable size of political parties or, rather, size of their electoral 
support. The most frequently used instrument for assessing the number of parties, 
which also takes account of their size, is the index of the effective number of parties.
The concept of the effective number of parties was created by M. Laakso and 
R. Taagepera on the basis of D. Rae’s index of fractionalization. The effective 
number of parties can be calculated either from a share of the votes cast in the 
election (named the effective number of electoral parties), or the share of mandates 
received (named the effective number of parliamentary parties). The procedure is 
similar in both cases: after the calculation and squaring the shares of individual 
parties, shares are added together and the result is divided by the number 1 (Laakso 
– Taagepera 1979: 3–27). The question is how to deal with votes included in the 
“others” category of election results. Given that in the cases examined by us the 
residual category does not exceed 10 % of the total votes cast, in accordance with 
the recommendation of M. Gallagher and P. Mitchell we do not include the residual 
category in our calculations. This will affect the overall result no more than a few 
tenths of a percent (Gallagher – Mitchell 2005: 600).
The evaluation of the effective number of political parties makes it possible 
to answer the question how much observed party systems are fragmented. The 
fragmentation of a party system is an important indicator of a low rate of institu-
tionalization, though causality cannot be inferred among these phenomena. Even 
4 For equations see Powell and Tucker 2009b: 5–6.
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fragmented systems may have a high degree of institutionalization and conversely 
systems with a low degree of fragmentation may not always be highly institutional-
ized. It is therefore necessary to assess this criterion in the context of others, and 
also to take account of its changes over time.
Average age of political parties in parliament
It should make no sense to average the lifespan of all existing political parties. It 
is better to focus only on – in a certain way – relevant political parties. In this case, 
we involve in our analysis only political parties represented in parliament. We do not 
pursue their whole life cycle, but only the duration of their presence in parliament (f. 
e. Tavits 2005: 289 proceeds similarly). The indicator of the average age of parties in 
parliament is related to the present, because we analyze only political parties which 
obtained at least one mandate in parliament according to the last election held. As 
a starting point we consider elections in 1990, from which the presence of political par-
ties in parliament is beginning to count. Thus the maximal possible score is 20 (years).
There is of course a difference, whether the party which emerges or disappears 
is a bigger or smaller one. The establishment or termination of the political party 
acquiring the minimal number of seats and standing “on the edge” of parliament 
has less impact on the party system than the emergence or disappearance of politi-
cal parties being able to win elections. Given this constraint, it is necessary to take 
this criterion as supplementary and auxiliary.
Institutionalization of the party systems of Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania 
and Slovenia
The party systems of post-communist Europe are often considered as unstable 
and fl uid compared to those in Western Europe. Do the analyzed cases fi t into this 
classic template some 20 years since the transition to democracy? Can we trace 
a common trend towards greater stability and institutionalization? Now we are go-
ing to try answering these questions using three indicators: electoral volatility, the 
effective number of parties and the average age of parliamentary parties.
Electoral volatility in Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia5
One of the features of post-communist party systems is a high level of electoral 
volatility (f. e. Bielasiak 2002: 198; Mair 1997: 182; Ágh 1998: 202). The analyzed 
cases confi rm this assumption, the average electoral volatility in all cases is well 
above the average of advanced democracies, which extended to 12,6 % in the 1990s 
5 If not stated otherwise, this section is based on the calculations of volatility in Powell and Tucker 
2009a, Powel and Tucker 2009b and on the author’s own calculations.
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(Dalton – McAllister – Wattenberg 2002: 31). The average scores of examined 
cases are three times higher (see Table 1).
Table 1: Average electoral volatility during period 1990–2007
Country Type A volatility (%) Type B volatility (%) Total volatility (%)
Bulgaria 21 16 37
Croatia 19 11 30
Romania 35 9 44
Slovenia 17 18 35
Source: Powell – Tucker 2009b: 31
If we consider two different types of volatility, i.e. volatility caused by the emer-
gence or disappearance of political parties (type A) and volatility due to shifts in 
electoral support among existing parties (type B), we come to the conclusion that 
between the post-communist countries and advanced democracies there exists 
a signifi cant difference. From the calculation carried out by Powell and Tucker 
(2009a: 13–14) it is clear that type B volatility prevails over type A in Western de-
mocracies. On the contrary, total electoral volatility in post-communist countries is 
largely made up of type A volatility. Most notably, it is true in the cases of Romania 
and Croatia; it is also evident in the case of Bulgaria, where in addition after the 
last elections in 2009, which is not included in the calculation, type A volatility 
further increased. The only exception is Slovenia, where the proportion of both 
types of volatility is roughly the same. However, even in the case of Slovenia, type 
A volatility is signifi cantly higher than the West European average.
Comparing the development of both types of volatility in Western Europe with the 
post-communist countries, the difference is apparent. Type B volatility has a slightly 
increasing curve in Western Europe as well as in the post-communist states, whereas 
the average value in the post-communist countries is about half again as high (8 % 
to 14 %). Type A volatility creates a signifi cant difference between the two regions. 
While in Western Europe type A volatility shows a similar trend as the type B vola-
tility, whereas it amounts about one third compared to type B, in post-communist 
countries it gradually decreases and is now compared with type B volatility by about 
half again as high. Type A volatility, in this respect, constitutes the main difference 
between the post-communist party systems and those of Western Europe.
In terms of the average volatility in post-communist countries, the analyzed cases 
fall into two categories. Bulgaria and Romania show above average values, Croatia 
and Slovenia embody below average values. In Bulgaria, volatility shows an in-
creasing trend. Type B volatility as well as total volatility has been increasing, but 
not as much as type A. A Low degree of volatility in the 1990s can probably be 
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attributed to clearly defi ned cleavage6, the subsequent rise may be linked to the 
country’s economic problems and related voter dissatisfaction with the existing 
political elite. The case of Bulgaria is in contradiction with the overall slight down-
ward curve of electoral volatility in post-communist countries.
In Croatia, the total volatility is continuously decreasing, while it never reached 
even the average of post-communist countries. Type A volatility more or less follows 
the curve of the total volatility; it never reached even the average value in post-com-
munist states, with the exception of volatility between the fi rst and second elections 
in the early 1990s. Type B volatility faithfully refl ects the political situation at the turn 
of the millennium – an increasing rate of type B volatility indicated the shift in voter 
preferences from the till then dominant party to the opposition7 (Dolenec 2008: 28).
In the Romanian case, the overall volatility in most of the time exceeds the aver-
age of the post-communist countries. The instability of the party system is con-
fi rmed by the continuously high level of type A volatility, of around 35–40 %. In 
contrast, type B volatility has mostly below average values, suggesting that voters 
changing their preferences often choose new parties. Developments since 2004, 
however, indicate a certain tendency towards stabilization.
In Slovenia, the total volatility has been below the average of post-communist 
countries all the time from 1990 until now. The fact that type A volatility ever since 
1990 has not signifi cantly exceeded 20 % clearly demonstrates the relative stabil-
ity of the party system. In contrast, type B volatility has been generally above the 
average of type B volatility in post-communist states. It means that the bindings be-
tween voters and parties are not so tight in comparison with advanced democracies, 
nevertheless voters usually chose within the existing number of political parties and 
do not often vote for the new political parties.
Effective number of political parties in Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and 
Slovenia8
As a point of reference, we can use the value of effective number of parties cal-
culated for 27 party systems by Arend Lijphart in his seminal work – the aver-
age number of electoral parties in the period 1945–1990 was 3,94 and the average 
number of parliamentary parties in the same period was 3,34 (Lijphart 1995: 99). 
Compared with these values, the observed cases mostly show a higher effective 
number of parties, still it is not so signifi cant, with the exception of Slovenia (see 
Table 2 and 3). Therefore they do not convincingly confi rm a general tendency 
6 communism/anticommunism
7 specifi cally, from the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) to the Social Democratic Party of Croatia
8 If not stated otherwise, this section is based on the author’s own calculations according to election 
results available at PARLINE and Elections in Europe.
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which is often mentioned in connection with the post-communist countries, sc. the 
high degree of fragmentation of their party systems.
Table 2: Effective number of electoral parties
Country Average since 1990 until last elections Last elections
Bulgaria 3,99 4,42 (2009)
Croatia 4,65 (since 2000 5,22) 4,23 (2007)
Romania 4,73 3,91 (2008)
Slovenia 6.63 4,93 (2008)
Source: Author’s own calculations, based on Gallagher 2010 and election results available at 
 PARLINE and Parties and Elections in Europe.
Table 3: Effective number of legislative parties
Country Average since 1990 until last elections Last elections
Bulgaria 3,02 3,34 (2009)
Croatia 2,89 (since 2000 3,54) 3,07 (2007)
Romania 3,64 3,60 (2008)
Slovenia 5,72 4,23 (2008)
Source: Author’s own calculations, based on Gallagher 2010 and election results available at 
 PARLINE and Parties and Elections in Europe.
In Western Europe since the Second World War, the continuous growth of the ef-
fective number of political parties can be seen, which has signifi cantly accelerated 
in the last twenty years.9 However, changes were gradual10 and can be recorded 
only in the long run (Dalton – McAllister – Wattenberg 2002: 32). Now we can 
compare this trend with the dynamics of the observed cases.
In the case of Bulgaria, the effective number of electoral parties has relatively 
strong fl uctuations, oscillating between 2,82 and 5,80. From the values of the ef-
fective number of parties we cannot infer a downward or an upward trend in the 
parties’ number. However, the last two elections have suggested a shift to greater 
fragmentation of the party system.
The Croatian case is specifi c, since it has had very low number of effective par-
ties in 1990s, determined by the existence of a dominant party (HDZ). After the 
landmark elections of 2000, the effective number of parties has grown twice. Then, 
it was followed by a decrease to the current value of 3,07 (parliamentary parties).
9 This increase can be observed in almost all Western European party systems, the only exception 
is the Netherlands. (Dalton – McAllister – Wattenberg 2002: 32).
10 with the exception of Belgium and Italy
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In the Romanian case, the signifi cant fragmentation of the party system could 
be observed during the 1990s, the effective number of parliamentary parties was 
almost 5. In the last two election periods there was a reduction of the effective 
number of parliamentary parties, which today stands at 3,6.
The Slovenian party system shows a tendency to a progressive concentration of 
party competition. The effective number of parties has been continually declining,11 
from the value of 9,0 in 1990 to the present value of 4,94. Nevertheless, Slovenia is 
still the most fragmented party system among the analyzed cases.
We can conclude that the analyzed cases do not unambiguously confi rm that the 
post-communist party systems embody a much higher degree of fragmentation of 
the party system. Due to the contradictory dynamics, i.e. that in the old democracies 
fragmentation is slightly increasing, while in the post-communist cases it is mostly 
slowly declining, a further blurring of the differences in the average values of the 
fragmentation of party systems can be expected in the future.
Average age of current parliamentary parties in Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Romania and Slovenia12
Table 4 shows the average age of parliamentary parties. Only parties obtaining 
at least one mandate in the last election are included in the calculation. With the 
exception of Romania, the calculation in principle confi rms the trend documented 
by the other two criteria.
Table 4: Average age of current parliamentary parties in the period 1990–2010
Country Average age of parties
Bulgaria 10,29
Croatia 13,56
Romania 17,20
Slovenia 16,29
Source: Author’s own calculations, based on PARLINE and Parties and Elections in Europe
Romania embodies a high degree of volatility, especially type A, which would 
indicate a signifi cantly fl uid political environment. A relatively high and fre-
quently changing effective number of parties contribute to this fi nding. What does 
a high average age of parliamentary parties mean in this context? It can be seen as 
a symptom of a certain tendency towards greater consolidation. All political parties 
11 The only exception was the elections in 2004, when the value of the effective number of parties 
stagnated in comparison with prior elections.
12 If not stated otherwise, this section is based on the author’s own calculations according to election 
results available at PARLINE and Elections in Europe.
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represented at present in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies exhibit signifi cant 
parliamentary history, the main political parties have been working in parliament 
since the beginning of the democratic transition. Conclusions about the low level 
of institutionalization resulting from the previous two criteria can be slightly cor-
rected referring to the high age of parliamentary parties.
In Bulgaria, the average age of parliamentary parties is the lowest among the ana-
lyzed cases. It confi rms the low level of institutionalization, which results mainly 
from the high level of electoral volatility. That is also very well illustrated by the 
fact that today’s ruling political party13 participated in the election for the fi rst time 
in 2009. In the terms of party’s parliamentary age, this party has existed for only one 
year. Unlike Romania, in the case of Bulgaria we cannot talk about the formation of 
a stable core of the party system formed by political parties existing in the long term.
The high average age of parliamentary parties in Slovenia’s National Assem-
bly confi rms that, despite the high fragmentation of the party system, it embodies 
a higher degree of stability in comparison with Romania and Bulgaria. The largest 
political parties have been presented in parliament since 1990 and thus have created 
the basis of the party system, from which its increasing stabilization may be arise 
from in the future.
In the case of Croatia, it also recorded a relatively high average age of parliamentary 
parties, which confi rms the previous criteria. Like in the case of Slovenia, we can talk 
of a “hard core” of the party system, since the two currently strongest political parties 
have been present in parliament since 1990. Of course it is necessary to take into 
account the qualitative side of the issue – The Croatian Democratic Movement has 
undergone a major internal transformation and today it is a party with signifi cantly 
different characteristics than in the 1990s (Dolenec 2008: 39). Still, its long-term pres-
ence may act as a counterweight against the destabilizing forces in the party system.
Conclusion
Direction toward a higher degree of stability reported as a symptomatic sign of 
party systems in post-communist countries can be, after examining the cases of Bul-
garia, Romania, Croatia and Slovenia, confi rmed only in the latter two. The lowest 
rate of institutionalization according to the three observed criteria is exhibited by 
the Bulgarian party system, which especially embodies the particularly high degree 
of volatility of both types. A relatively low level of institutionalization is shown 
also in the case of Romania, mainly due to a very high level of volatility caused 
by the emergence and disappearance of party system actors. However, there can be 
observed a positive trend in the direction toward stabilization and consolidation of 
13 Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB).
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the party system in the last two election periods. Slovenia can be evaluated, despite 
the high degree of fragmentation of the party system, as relatively the most institu-
tionalized party system of the examined cases. It is mainly due to a particularly low 
level of type A volatility. A considerable high average age of parliamentary parties 
support aforesaid conclusion and to some extent compensates for the high level 
of fragmentation of the party system. Croatia is a similar case, but it embodies, in 
comparison with Slovenia, a higher degree of type A volatility, nevertheless we can 
monitor the downward trend of this indicator.
The purpose of this text is not to examine the causes and consequences of the 
observed phenomena, but let us make a brief note on this topic. The traditional 
explanation of a high level of volatility and fragmentation of the post-communist 
party systems expects that the basic cause is low voter loyalty, which causes a high 
degree of electoral volatility, leading to uncertainties in the election results, which 
eventuates in the emergence and disappearance of political parties, whose parlia-
mentary existence is at risk. However this explanation ignores the role and infl u-
ence of political elites in the whole process. Margit Tavits offers another explana-
tion, in a sense opposite: the primary reason is an impatient political elite that often 
cause the emergence of new political parties and the disappearance of parties at 
risk of electoral defeat – as the result of these changes on the supply side, there 
is consequently a decline in voter loyalty, which ultimately causes a high degree 
of electoral volatility (Tavits 2008: 6). This view in effect denies the inevitability 
of moving towards a higher degree of institutionalization of a party system, with 
which most scholars examining this issue operate. Likewise, it may undermine the 
perception of the institutionalization of party systems as a long-term process. In 
any case, research should pay more attention to the role of elites in the process of 
institutionalization in the future. Research could thus gain a new dimension, which 
until now has not been suffi ciently taken into account.
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